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ABSTRACT 
 
In this essay, I examine the connection between pricing, profit mark ups, competition, and 
economic activity from a heterodox perspective.  These issues are examined utilizing a two-
industry Burchardt-Kaleckian production model and a labor-based mark up pricing model; the 
conclusion reached is that market structure and competition have no fundamental role in 
affecting pricing, profit mark ups, or economic activity.  However, it is generally perceived in 
heterodox economics that competition does play an important role in the economy.  This theme 
is discussed in conjunction with the going business enterprise.  
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OLD CONTROVERSY REVISITED:  PRICING, MARKET STRUCTURE, AND  
 
COMPETITION 
 
In 1994, I wrote an article on Post Keynesian price theory (Lee, 1994) in which I made a 
number of claims and criticisms.  When responding to the article, Marc Lavoie (1996) rejected 
them on the grounds of the need to simplify the building of models (more specifically 
macroeconomic models).  Paul Downward and Peter Reynolds (1996) also criticized the article 
on a number of grounds.  Coming from an emerging critical realist perspective, my claims of 
empirical grounding and the use of a Sraffian-like pricing model appeared to them as naïve and 
working in a closed-system framework.  Moreover, they disagreed with my position that pricing 
models should be empirically constrained and hence should not be ‘ad hoc’ specified to suit the 
purpose at hand; thus they disagreed with my dismissal of Kaleckian and Weintraubian pricing 
and price models.  In my response (Lee 1996), I focused mostly on the issue of modeling and 
associated theoretical issues.  Needless to say, my critics were not satisfied with my response and 
wrote a further response (Downward, Lavoie, and Reynolds 1996) focusing on my use of realism 
and the lack of realism of the simulation pricing model I used to address particular theoretical 
issues; and ending with the claim that using simplified macroeconomic models is legitimate.  
The debate qua controversy came to an end with the critics the clear winners; and with it an end 
to almost any theoretical and empirical engagement among Post Keynesians or heterodox 
economists over pricing theory and its modeling. 
One of the issues that I had thought I laid to rest in the 1994 article as well as in my book 
Post Keynesian Price Theory (1998) is the supposed connection between pricing procedures, 
pricing policy, the profit mark up, and the degree of market competition.  I argued that there was 
no connection in that irrespective of the degree of market competition (or degree of market 
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imperfect competition) enterprises used variants of profit mark up on costs and associated 
pricing policies.  Therefore, the distinction between neoclassical pricing models of perfect 
competition and imperfect competition has no basis in Post Keynesian pricing theory and more 
generally in heterodox pricing theory.  In addition, the distinction between classical competition 
with its uniform rate of profits and imperfect competition is also unwarranted.  The gist of my 
argument was that, while enterprises saw themselves in a competitive environment, the nature of 
competition was different from both the classical and neoclassical views of competition and that 
pricing procedures were independent of the degree of market competition.  Since then, I have 
also concluded that the profit mark up and its magnitude are largely unrelated to the degree of 
market competition and that the degree of competition qua profit mark up does not affect the 
degree of economic activity in the economy.  In the next section, I review the response to my 
1994 ROPE article and particularly the criticisms I directed at the mark up prices doctrine; but I 
conclude the section arguing that the really important issue that needs to be dealt with is the 
supposed connection between pricing, profit mark ups, competition, and economic activity.  In 
the second section, these issues are examined utilizing a two-industry Burchardt-Kaleckian 
production model and a labor-based mark up pricing model; the conclusion reached is that 
market structure and competition have no fundamental role in affecting pricing, profit mark ups, 
or economic activity.  However, it is generally perceived that competition does play an important 
role in the economy.  This theme is discussed in the third section in conjunction with the going 
business enterprise.  The conclusion to the chapter follows. 
Old debate:  pricing and market structure 
 The theoretical milieu that formed the context of Post Keynesian price theory in the 
1990s consisted of ideas and arguments that congealed around three price doctrines--  
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administered prices, normal cost prices, and mark up prices--and their associated pricing 
procedures qua models:  target rate of return pricing, normal cost pricing, and mark up pricing.  
Although the doctrines and their pricing models are not incommensurable with each other (Lee 
1998), variations in their cost accounting foundations generate different pricing equations.  
Individually, of the three, the mark up pricing model has much less empirical support in terms of 
costing and pricing procedures used by business enterprises relative to the costing and pricing 
procedures of normal cost and target rate of return pricing models.  Moreover, all three models 
(especially the latter two) are easily grounded in Leontief-Sraffian circular production models, 
which have universal empirical support.  In contrast, mark up pricing models are generally 
embedded in an Burchardt two-industry production models in which there is no circular 
production, but rather a one-way configuration of production grounded in the original factor of 
production labor.
1
  Finally, the profit mark up in all three doctrines are under-theorized and lack 
empirical foundation beyond their mere existence in that there are very few empirical studies on 
how enterprises actually determine their profit mark ups for their various products.  In particular, 
Andrews’s degree of competition and Kalecki’s degree of monopoly are, once the ideology is 
ignored, more or less the same thing—that is the mark up is somehow related to market 
competition (or the lack there of) which is determined by the competitive structure of the market 
that can be empirically approximated by enterprise size, degree of concentration, and other 
factors affecting competition.  The various strengths and weaknesses of the three doctrines 
suggested, to me at least, that they could be combined in such a way that the weaknesses are 
significantly reduce if not eliminated while the strengths magnified.  But this meant that the mark 
up prices doctrine, which most Post Keynesians preferred, would lose its preeminence become, 
at best, co-equal with the other two doctrines. [Lee 1994, 1998] 
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   This outcome was and is unacceptable to most Post Keynesians and heterodox 
economists, as evident in the responses to my article by Lavoie, Downward, and Reynolds.  The 
reaction to my synthesis of the three doctrines into an integrated Post Keynesian-heterodox 
theory of pricing and prices was directed towards my rejection of the near universal assumption 
of constant average direct costs, differentiation between normal cost and mark up pricing, and 
proposing the use of a multi-market interdependent pricing model.  Each of the objections, if 
sustained, would rehabilitate the one- or two-sector labor-based mark up pricing model.  
Common to and essentially underpinning the objections was a methodological concern over the 
relationship of the real world to economic models and their ‘internal world’.   
When developing the pricing model, I took the position that it must be empirically 
grounded, which meant that it must incorporate the diversity of pricing procedures found in the 
real world.  Drawing upon the empirical evidence I gathered at the time (Lee 1995, 1998; also 
see Gu and Lee forthcoming), I developed a general pricing model based upon the diversity of 
pricing procedures that was theoretically differentiated, like the real world.  The model stood in 
contrast to the simplifying assumptions and stylized facts used to articulate the much simplified 
mark up pricing model.  It is easy to show that the two models generate different quantitative 
results (Lee 1996); but are the results theoretically significant?  This point generated much 
heated debate since it appeared to Downward, Lavoie, and others that without the use of 
simplifying assumptions and their resulting models, it would not be possible to carry on a range 
of research of interest to Post Keynesian economists.  In particular, the methodological position 
adopted by many Post Keynesian-heterodox economists is that simplified empirically inaccurate 
models can actually contribute to understanding the real world and hence it is appropriate to 
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construct different kinds of models, including quite inexact but simple models, to examine 
different kinds theoretical and real world issues and arrive at empirical and practical results.   
Little methodological justification (other than referring to open system theorizing) has 
been put forth for the position.  There is, after all, a difference between a simplified model that 
includes the appropriate structures and causal mechanisms and an empirically inaccurate or false 
model in terms of structures and causal mechanisms, for the latter cannot provide meaningful 
empirical and practical results.  Moreover, given the mathematical tools available, it is unclear 
why it is not possible to utilize a differentiated yet simplified model that can be used to 
investigate theoretical issues of interest to heterodox economists and arrive at empirical and 
practical results.  However, because inexact and simple models have a tenuous connection to the 
real world and hence are not structurally or causally constrained by it, it is possible to examine 
its operation and outcomes on its own terms. Hence, it is possible to explore the world of the 
model and then claim (but without any methodological justification) that what is analyzed in the 
model has something to say about the real world.   This is perhaps the basis for support of this 
methodological position—that is, working with models where the real world is an inconvenient 
backdrop. 
 These particular concerns are minor relative to a possibly more important theoretical 
point, that there is a disjuncture between the pricing model of the economy and its corresponding 
output-employment model and hence the elimination of any price-output/employment 
relationship.  That is, the factors that determine the prices are distinct and separate from those 
that determine output and employment.  This not only means that demand curves of any sort 
cannot be located in the analysis as well as the notion of profit maximization; it also suggests 
that variations in the profit mark up (or Kalecki’s degree of monopoly) do not affect economic 
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activity.  But there is also a much deeper issue which was not part of the old controversy and 
which I did not fully perceive at the time—that is the degree of competition/monopoly, which 
represents whether markets are imperfectly competitive or not, actually has no analytical 
foundation or role in Post Keynesian-heterodox analysis.  That is, the often made assumption of 
imperfect markets qua imperfect competition to justify a mark up pricing (or any pricing) model 
is without meaning or relevance.  This is in fact the fundamental issue that can be taken from the 
old controversy. 
Competition, profit mark ups, and economic activity 
 In heterodox pricing literature, it is often argued that under the market conditions of 
imperfect competition, enterprises use mark up pricing procedures and the degree of imperfect 
competition or monopoly determines the profit mark up; 
(1) [ADC][1 + k] = price 
where  ADC is average direct costs and is either assumed constant or determined at normal 
capacity utilization, and 
 k is the profit mark up or degree of monopoly or competition. 
Since ADC is assumed as to be known, the determination of the price requires that k be known.  
So to close the pricing model, two arguments are used.  The first is that the profit mark up is 
determined by fundamental (as opposed to immediate market) forces, such as market 
concentration, sales promotion, and the ratio of overhead costs to direct costs, all of which imply 
a market structure where enterprises have at least some control over competition.  The second 
argument first assumes ADC is constant and equal to marginal costs, then introduces a enterprise 
demand curve, and finally equates the profit mark up to the price elasticity of demand (ed) 
derived from the demand curve: 
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(2) k = (ed – 1)
-1
.      
Given this derivation of the profit mark up, it is also possible to say that the enterprise is engaged 
in profit maximization since mark up pricing is equivalent to equating marginal costs to marginal 
revenue.  More significantly, as the price elasticity of demand descends from infinity (perfect 
competition) towards one, the profit mark up increases, thus giving the impression that it 
emerges within in the context of market exchanges and competition:  so the more competition 
the smaller the mark up and vice versa.  However, the concept of the enterprise demand curve is 
highly problematical in mainstream theory, and there is no theoretical (and empirical) basis for 
such a demand curve in heterodox theory.  In addition, there is very little evidence that 
enterprises consciously and explicitly adjust their profit mark ups in light of changing degrees of 
competition.  Therefore, if a case is to be made that mark up pricing and the profit mark up are 
linked to a certain kind of market structure qua degree of competition, then some other 
arguments are needed.
2
 [Lee 1990-91a, 1990-91b, 1998] 
 Since the above problems emerge because of the need to close the pricing model is 
needed.  There is a possible alternative approach that is Kaleckian in origin and hence 
thematically consistent with mark up pricing is a two-industry price-output-employment model 
where workers spend what they get and capitalists spend all their profits on investment goods.  
To see what it is, first consider the following very inexact two-industry price-output-employment 
model of the economy: 
(3) Qm(lmwm)(1 + rm) = Qmpm 
 
 Qc(lcwc)(1 + rc) = Qcpc 
 
where Qm is the output of machines, 
 
 Qc is the output of the consumption good, 
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 lm is the constant labor production coefficient for the machine industry, 
 
 lc is the constant labor production coefficient for the consumption good industry, 
 
 wm is the wage rate in the machine industry, 
 
 wc is the wage rate in the consumption good industry, 
 
 rm is the profit mark up in the machine industry, 
 
 rc is the profit mark up in the consumption good industry, 
 
 pm is the price of machines, and 
 
 pc is the price of the consumption good. 
 
Assuming that only labor costs are used as the cost base for setting the price, the pricing model 
of the economy is  
(4) (lmwm)(1 + rm) = pm 
 
 (lcwc)(1 + rc) = pc. 
 
Production in the model consists of machines with labor producing machines and machines with 
labor producing consumption goods.  In order for the economy to be productive, that is to 
produce more machines than used up in the production of machines so that the ‘surplus’ 
machines could produce consumption goods, the output-machine ratio for the machine industry, 
qmm, must be greater than one.  On the other hand, the output-machine ratio for the consumption 
goods industry, qcm, needs only to be greater than zero.  Finally, given the constant labor 
production coefficients and assuming homogeneous labor, total employment, L, is proportional 
to the output of machine and consumption goods:  lmmQm + lcmQc = L.  For the moment, it is 
assumed that all the machines produced in the machine industry are entirely used up in the 
production of machines and consumption goods, thereby making the surplus of the economy 
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consist entirely of consumption goods, Qc.  Thus the output-employment model of the economy 
is 
    [qmm/(qmm - 1)][Qc/qcm] = Qm 
 
(5)                 qcmMc = Qc 
 
  lm[qmm/(qmm - 1)][ Qc/qcm] + lc qcm[Qc/qcm] = L 
where Mc is the number of machines currently used in the consumption goods industry. 
 The technical givens of the price and output-employment models are the labor production 
coefficients lm, lc, and the output-machine ratios qmm and qcm; values for the given for the money 
wage rates wm and wc are exogenously given; and the quantity of Qc is assumed.  The unknowns 
of the model include pm, pc, Qm, Mc, L, rm, and rc.  With five equations from (4) and (5) and 
seven unknowns, two additional equations are needed to close the model.  Utilizing the 
Kaleckian proposition that capitalists spend all their profits on machines, we have the following: 
 (6) Qm(lmwm)rm = (Qm - Mc)pm 
 
 (7) Qc(lcwc)rc = (Mc)pm. 
 
Equation (6) states that all the profits in the machine industry are spent on purchasing machines 
to replace those that have worn out; while equation (7) states that all the profits of the 
consumption good industry are spent on purchasing machines to replace those that have also 
worn out.  Thus all profits are spent on purchasing investment goods (that is machines).  With 
these two equations the model is fully specified and given the above assumptions, all the 
unknowns are determined.   
 What is significant about these results is what determines the profit mark ups.  In the case 
of rm, it is technically determined by qmm: 
(8) rm = 1/(qmm - 1). 
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As for rc, it is determined by the technical givens of the model as well as the assume values for 
the wage rates: 
(9) rc = lmwm x     qmm    . 
          lcwc   qcm(qmm - 1) 
 
One implication of equations (8 and 9) is that the profit mark ups per se emerge prior to market 
transactions and so are non-price phenomena, and hence exist prior to any degree of market 
competition, because the machine industry produces more machines than it uses up on 
production, qmm > 1and more generally because Qm > 0.  A second implication is that their 
magnitude is determined by the fertility of the production process modified in the case of rc by 
wage costs; hence changes in the profit mark ups arise from changes in the external technical 
conditions of production and the wage rates:  the more fertile the technology, the greater qmm and 
qcm are and hence the lower the profit mark ups are.  Thus, the magnitude of and changes in the 
profit mark ups are not affected by any degree of competition; in fact, market competition has no 
role to play in the determined of the profit mark up, prices, or any other aspect of the model.   
One outcome of this structural determination of the profit mark ups is that variations in 
Qc neither affect the profit mark up or prices—that is Qm and Qc are unrelated to their prices, 
which means that there are no enterprise demand curves and the price elasticity has no role in 
determining the profit mark up.  This implies that there is no role for any ‘market power’ derived 
from some structural characteristics of market exchanges in the determination of the profit mark 
up.  A second outcome is that the profit mark ups in general are technically qua structurally 
differentiated, meaning no uniformity of profit mark ups (which is nearly equivalent to saying 
that there is no uniform rate of profit).  Moreover, there is no reason that they should be equal.  
That is, given technology, the profit mark ups are designed to ensure that that for any given Qc, 
Qm is appropriately divided between to two industries to ensure production.  A final outcome is 
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that the profit mark ups per se has no impact on overall economic activity since Qc is determined 
independently of them.  Thus, technical change that reduces qmm and/or qcm resulting in the 
reduction of the profit mark ups does not affect Qc but does affect the total amount of labor 
employed.  Similarly, changing wage rates can affect rc but has not affect on total economic 
activity, but rather only on the division of Qc among the workers in the two industries.  
In short, what the above analysis indicates is that competition and market structures have 
no fundamental systemic theoretical role to play in the model.  Thus, the Post Keynesian reliance 
on market structures, imperfect competition, degree of monopoly, and downward sloping 
demand curves to explain the profit mark up and the use of mark up pricing procedures has no 
basis in the model.  On the other hand, their support for differentiated mark ups is well 
corroborated by the model; however, the differential mark ups carry no implications regarding 
the degree of competition or market power.  Moreover, the expectation that strategic competition 
(Moudud 2010) will drive profit mark ups to uniformity has no support as well as there is no 
room for profit maximizing behavior to exist.  Finally, if the model is slightly extended to the 
production of more machines than used up in production, then profit mark ups are affected, 
moving in the same direction as the production of the surplus machines.
3
  This outcome supports 
the Post Keynesian view noted above that links investment to the profit mark up, but this has 
little to do with competition or a uniform rate of profit.  
Of course these outcomes are clearly specific to the overall inexact model developed 
above (equations 3-7).  However, they do not significantly change when the model is made more 
empirically exact and is extended to circular production with non-basic surplus of fixed 
investment, government, and consumption goods, profits being spent on fixed investment and 
consumption goods, and the state demands and purchases the state goods with state money (Lee 
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2011).  In particular, profit mark ups retain their non-market origins and determination, their 
non-uniformity, and their stability in faced of different degrees of monopoly qua competition.  
Yet there is a wide spread belief among heterodox economists that competition in one form or 
another plays an important role in the economy, even if it does not play a fundamental role.  To 
examine this point, it is necessary to go to the concept of the going business enterprise.       
The going enterprise and competition 
The concept of the going concern refers to business enterprises with continuity of 
economic activity and an indefinite life span (as opposed to a terminal venture or an enterprise in 
the process of liquidation).  It consists of a going plant or productive capabilities and a going 
business which referred to managerial activities, such as investment, research and development, 
and pricing, that affect the enterprise’s market transactions over time.  For the going plant and 
the going business to work together to ensure a flow of actual and expected transactions, there 
must be working rules (institutions) within the going concern that make it happen; and also an 
external array of working rules which ensure that the flow of transactions in the market place 
occur in a manner which enables the going business enterprise to continue indefinitely.  
Moreover, the going enterprise needs to reckon its costs, revenues, and income (profits) in a 
manner that does not disrupt its productive capabilities; and this requires the implementation of 
appropriate working rules known as pricing procedures.  Thus, a going business enterprise has 
the productive capabilities, managerial capabilities, and the working rules including pricing 
procedures that enable it to have expectations of a future which is in some degree of their own 
making.  This means that the going enterprise has the capabilities qua power (that are 
independent of the market and hence market imperfections) of affecting market transactions.
4
 
[Storey 1959; Sterling 1968]  
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The theoretical significance of the going enterprise is that it is the organizational 
mechanism by which the capitalist class gains ongoing access to the state-monetized social 
provisioning process through the continuous flow of profit-derived dividends and salary income.  
Thus the motivation of the business leaders of a going enterprise is to maintain and augment this 
cash flow, and this is accomplished through a hierarchical set of goals, the most basic being 
survival qua reproduction and continuation of the business enterprise.  This requires a positive 
business income, that is profits; but seeking profits is not an end in itself.  Rather, profits are 
needed to maintain the going enterprise and for the capitalist class to have access to the social 
provisioning process.  Consequently, business leaders are not seeking to maximize profits but to 
generate a flow of business income needed to meet their goals and access to social provisioning.  
Therefore, the going enterprise adopts a variety of sub-goals or particular business strategies with 
different temporal dimensions, such as increasing market share, increasing the profit mark up 
through raising it or reducing costs, developing new products and creating and/or entering new 
markets, engaging in collective price-determination, and/or seeking government support, to meet 
this objective.
5
   
 As suggested above, to be a going enterprise, it is necessary to employ pricing procedures 
that are designed in some manner to set a price that both covers costs and generate profits.  To 
illustrate this point consider a very simple model of the going enterprise where its going plant 
produces a single product at normal capacity utilization.  For production to occur, the enterprise 
must have enough working capital on hand to procure the necessary amount of direct and 
overhead inputs.  Once obtained, production occurs, the output sold, and the revenue collected.  
If the amount of total revenue received at the end of the production period equals the initial 
expenditure of working capital for the inputs, the enterprise can repeat the process for succeeding 
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production periods thus reproducing the going enterprise over time as long as the original sum of 
money advanced is returned: 
 production period 1: Mwc --> TCn --> Pn --> TRn    
(10) production period 2: Mwc --> TCn --> Pn --> TRn     
 production period n: Mwc --> TCn --> Pn --> TRn     
     etc. 
where  Mwc is the cash advanced in the form of working capital; 
  TCn is total costs at normal capacity utilization; 
 Pn is production at normal capacity utilization; and 
 TRn is the total revenue at normal capacity utilization. 
Thus in the simple model, the going enterprise can only engage in sequential acts of production 
at normal capacity utilization only when total costs equals total revenue, or, more specifically, 
only when the enterprise sets its price equal to average total costs at normal capacity utilization:  
p = NATC.  The model can be extended beyond the simple reproduction of the going enterprise 
by postulating that total revenue is greater than total costs at normal capacity utilization, which 
necessitates setting a price that covers costs and produces a profit:  p = [NATC][1+r].  Through 
the use of mark up, normal cost, or target rate of return pricing procedures, the going enterprise 
can (assuming normal capacity utilization or greater) ensure that it remains a going concern that 
both generates incomes for the business leaders which gives them access to the social 
provisioning process and at the same time enables the enterprise to reproduce and as well as to 
expand and develop.
6
 
 The implication of the above model is that the price set by the going enterprise is crucial 
to its reproduction and expansion over time.  That is, if the enterprise’s price fell below costs, 
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NATC > p, then it could not long continue to engage in sequential acts production and 
reproduction.  Moreover, if its price is below [NATC][1 + r] so that the ‘target’ profit mark up is 
not achieved, then the enterprise would have a cash flow short-fall resulting in delaying or 
dropping investment and product development plans, and a reduction of dividend payments.  
Thus, the model suggests that the going enterprise is driven, irrespective of competitive market 
conditions, to adopt and utilize normal cost, mark up, and or target rate of return pricing 
procedures to first ensure that the price covers costs at normal capacity utilization and secondly 
to apply a profit mark up consistent with its cash flow or profit needs.
7
  Determined through 
administrative action within the enterprise prior to production (hence knowledge of actual costs) 
and market exchange, the enterprise administers its normal cost prices to the market.  The 
primary property of such administered prices is that they remain unchanged from three to 
twenty-four months, for many sequential transactions, and for variations in output qua sales.
8
 
 Because the going enterprise exists in markets with other competing enterprises, 
competitive conditions may generate market prices that would seriously affect the going 
enterprise's ability to reproduce and expand.  As noted above, going enterprises have capabilities 
of affecting market transactions, hence the ability to inflict unacceptable consequences upon 
competitors.  In particular, they have the ability to a greater or lesser degree to eliminate the 
positive net cash flows of competitors, in so far as the cash flows are derived from, or depend 
upon, activities in the markets in which they participate.  Competition between enterprises in the 
production and the sale of goods involves the use of these capabilities and is the effort of trying 
to make a profitable volume of sales in the face of the offers of other enterprises selling identical 
or closely similar products.  Aspects of competition include advertising, service, product 
development, and price.  The combination of capabilities to affect market transactions and 
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competition creates the all too real possibility of price wars and destructive competition.  So 
given the immediate impact a price war has on the enterprise’s profits and hence cash flow, 
enterprises are driven to establish market governance organizations that would eliminate the 
problem of destructive price competition and establish a stable market price:  going enterprises 
are always in search of orderly markets through collective, cooperative action.
9
  Such 
organizations that engage in market governance and regulate competition include trade 
associations, cartels, open price associations, price leadership, and government regulatory 
commissions; in addition, governments enact legislation that also regulates competition. 
 The foundation of all market governance organizations are social network relationships 
of the competing enterprises, some of which are multilateral relationships while others are 
associational relationships.
10
  That is, enterprises engage in collective action to bring competitive 
order to their markets.  In some cases, market governance is carried out via a cartel where 
collective action sets prices and regulates competitive interaction; but in other cases, it is carried 
out via price leadership with an underlying associational relationship among other enterprises to 
follow the price leader.  Moreover, whether the degree of market concentration is high or low or 
the barriers to entry are significant or not, they have little impact on market governance per se; 
rather they only affect the organizational form that market governance takes.  Therefore, all 
markets are characterized by regulated competition constructed by going enterprises.  So all 
markets are equally competitive; and all enterprises take into account other enterprises when 
making pricing (and investment, research and development, and marketing) decisions.  And most 
significantly, the going enterprises create a form of market governance that regulates competition 
in their interests:  competition is pervasive but not pernicious or destructive.
11
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Conclusion 
 Philip Andrews characterized the combination of oligopoly and competition as 
competitive oligopoly (Lee 1998, ch. 5).
12
  But since competitively regulated markets via a 
market governance organization exist for all industrial, wholesale, and retail markets, the 
neoclassical distinction of competitive vs. imperfectly competitive markets and the heterodox-
Marxian distinction of competitive vs. oligopoly-monopoly capitalism have no basis.  Because 
competitively regulated markets have existed (at least in the Great Britain and the United States) 
since before 1800, the view that competitive capitalism existed in the 19
th
 century and monopoly 
capitalism existed in the 20
th
 century also has no basis.  To be sure, the organizational form of 
market governance changed from associational to large enterprise price leadership, but the 
degree of competition remained regulated.
13
  Finally, regulated competition is not the same as 
classical competition.  What this suggests is that going enterprises are embedded in a regulated 
competitive environment of their own making.  So competition is perceived as pervasive, but 
competition shorn of its destructive potential.  In this context, competition affects the life span of 
a particular going enterprise, but not the going enterprise in general.  That is, competition is 
something that individual enterprises are concerned about, but it has no impact on the 
fundamental social relationships that govern capitalism, on the existence of profit, profit mark 
ups, or economic activity.   
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Notes 
 
1
 This type of production model has no empirical support whatsoever:  see Lee (1998: ch. 12) 
and Miller and Blair (2009:  Appendix B). 
 
2
 There is a third argument which has the profit mark up determined by the need to fund 
investment.  Hence enterprises consciously change their mark ups to adopt their cash flows to 
match their investment financing needs.  However, there is almost no empirical evidence to 
support this very interesting theoretical position. [Lee 1998] 
 
3
While the pricing model of the economy (equation 4) remains the same, the output-employment 
model becomes 
 
 [qmm/(qmm - 1)][Qc/qcm + M*m + M*c] = Qm 
(5a)         qcMc = Qc 
 lm[qmm/(qmm - 1)][ Qc/qcm + M*m + M*c] + lc qcm[Qc/qcm] = L 
 
 where M*m and M*c are the extra machines to be produced; and 
   Qm = Mm + Mc + M*m + M*c. 
 
Finally, the Kaleckian equations become  
 
(6a) Qm( lmwm)rm = (Qm - Mc - M*c)pm 
(7a) Qc(lcwc)rc = (Mc + M*c)pm. 
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When solving for the profit mark ups, we find that they are now a function of the production of 
the additional machines: 
 
(8a) rm = [qmm/(qmm - 1)][Mc + M*m + M*c] - Mc - M*c  
                             Mc + M*c 
 
(9a) rc =  lmwm x [qmm/qmm - 1)][Mc + M*m + M*c]. 
         lcwc               qcmMc 
 
Thus for a given Mc, increasing either M*m or M*c will result in higher output, employment, 
prices, and profit mark ups; but since the amount of the consumption good has remained the 
same, the real income of workers decline.   
 
4
The going concern conception of the business enterprise originated with Veblen and Commons 
and is virtually identical to the conception of the business enterprise used by Post Keynesian and 
Marxist economists. [Commons 1957; Ramstad 2001; Kaufman 2006; Veblen 1904] 
 
5
The implication of sub-goals or strategies with different temporal dimensions is that they 
overlap with each other.  Consequently, it is not possible to argue in terms of short period or long 
period or the classical-Marxian long period, or any other kind of analytical ahistorical time 
period.  The only permissible analytical time period is historical time.  
 
6
The model can be extended to include variations in capacity utilization and differential 
allocations of profits between dividends and the procurement of the plant and equipment needed 
to expand capacity.  The model can also be extended to the case of a multi-product enterprise.   
  
7
Whether such a profit mark up is competitive or not cannot be ascertained in large part because 
the mark up itself is not based on competition per se.  Evidence is sparse on the determinants and 
behavior of profit mark ups of specific products, but it appears that the need for a particular cash 
flow contributes significantly to the magnitude of the profit mark up and that profit mark ups 
remain stable of extended periods of time, such as five or ten years or more (since prices 
themselves remain constant for up to two years—see fn. 8).  But when they do change, 
competitive pressures are often referred to, not fluctuations in demand. [Lee 1998] 
 
8
 The evidence of price stability is extensive—see Lee (1998), Blinder, et al. (1998), and Fabiani 
et al. (2007).  This suggests that administered prices are set largely without reference to an 
inverse price-sales relationship and are not set to achieve a specific degree of capacity utilization.  
In various studies of price determination, business enterprises have stated that variations in their 
prices within practical limits, given the prices of their competitors, produced virtually no change 
in their sales and that variations in the market price, especially downward, produced little if any 
changes in market sales in the short term.  Moreover, when the price change is significant 
enough to result in a non-insignificant change in sales, the impact on profits has been negative 
enough to persuade enterprises not to try the experiment again. 
 
23 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
9
 This claim is highly contentious since suggests that going enterprises and their business leaders 
are collectivists, co-operators at heart and not the aggressive individualst concerned about 
nothing else than their own narrow self-interests.  It is rather remarkable that Marxists (and other 
heterodox economists but generally not Institutionalists) hold this latter position, which is also 
held by Austrian and most other mainstream economists. 
  
10
 The social network represents the social and economic interaction of the agents in terms of 
codes of moral-economic behavior, trust, familiarity, and business customs.  Thus, it both 
constrains the set of actions the agents can choose as well as facilitates market transactions. 
 
11
 Breakdowns of market governance occur, but they are exceptions not the rule.  And when they 
do, efforts are immediately undertaken to re-establish some form of market governance.  In fact, 
in many cases, the breakdown of one form of market governance was the result of the 
establishment of a different form of market governance.  Moreover, there are cases where new 
entrants into a market are incorporated into the existing form of market governance as a way to 
re-establish market stability. 
 
12
 Oligopoly exists when enterprises recognize the existence of other competing enterprises and 
thus realize that their strategic decisions regarding prices, for example, will elicit responses from 
their competitors.  While oligopoly does suggest fewness (and corresponding large size and high 
barriers to entry), the exact number is indeterminate.  In fact, through social networks and 
associational relationships, enterprises and their business leaders can recognize interdependency 
over a very large number of competitors that can be geographically dispersed and so adopt a 
motto that an injury to one is an injury to all. 
 
13
 This rejection of the competitive-monopoly dichotomy of the Paul Sweezy and the monopoly 
capital school as well as the social structures of accumulation school leaves untouched its core 
theoretical contribution of ‘the tendency to economic stagnation.  My argument is, instead, that 
capitalism has always been prone to economic stagnation for reasons unrelated to competition. 
[Baran and Sweezy 1966; McDonough 1994] 
